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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the important yet unexplored subject of crowding ef-
fects on market impact, that we call “co-impact”. Our analysis is based on a large
database of metaorders by institutional investors in the U.S. equity market. We find
that the market chiefly reacts to the net order flow of ongoing metaorders, without
individually distinguishing them. The joint co-impact of multiple contemporaneous
metaorders depends on the total number of metaorders and their mutual sign cor-
relation. Using a simple heuristic model calibrated on data, we reproduce very well
the different regimes of the empirical market impact curves as a function of volume
fraction φ: square-root for large φ, linear for intermediate φ, and a finite intercept
I0 when φ → 0. The value of I0 grows with the sign correlation coefficient. Our
study sheds light on an apparent paradox: How can a non-linear impact law survive
in the presence of a large number of simultaneously executed metaorders?
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1 Introduction
The market impact of trades, i.e. the change in price conditioned on signed trade
size, is a key quantity characterizing market liquidity and price dynamics [1, 2].
Besides being of paramount interest for any economic theory of price formation,
impact is a major source of transaction costs, which often makes the difference
between a trading strategy that is profitable, and one that is not. Hence the interest
in this topic is not purely academic in nature.
One of the most surprising empirical finding in the last 25 years is the fact that
the impact of a so-called “metaorder” of total size Q, executed incrementally over
time, increases approximately as the square root of Q, and not linearly in Q, as
one may have naively expected and as indeed predicted by the now-classic Kyle
model [3]. Since impact is non-additive, a natural question concerns the interaction
of different metaorders executed simultaneously – possibly with different signs and
sizes. In particular, one may wonder whether the simultaneous impact of different
metaorders could substantially alter the square root law; or conversely whether the
square root law might itself result from the interaction of different metaorders.
Metaorder information is, however, not publicly available, and earlier analyses
were mostly based on (often proprietary) data from single financial institutions.
These studies give little insight about effects due to the simultaneous execution of
metaorders from different investors, which we will call co-impact hereafter. Indeed,
even if investors individually decide about their metaorders, they might do so based
on the same trading signal. Prices can thus be affected by emergent effects such
as crowding. What is the right way to model the total market impact of simul-
taneous metaorders on the same asset on the same day? In order to answer this
question, we will use a rich dataset concerning the execution of metaorders issued
by a heterogeneous set of investors.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the Ancerno dataset we
used empirically. In Sec. 3 we discuss the limits of the validity of the square root law
on the daily level. In Sec. 4 we find that the market impact of simultaneous daily
metaorders is proportional to the square root of their net order flow. This means
that the market does not distinguish the different individual metaorders. We then
construct a theoretical framework to understand the impact of correlated metaorders
in Sec. 5. This allows us to understand when a single asset manager will observe
a square-root impact law, and when crowding effects will lead to deviations from
such a behaviour. We also compare in Sec. 5 the results of our simple mathematical
model with empirical data, with very satisfactory results. Sec. 6 concludes.
2 The Ancerno Database
Our analysis relies on a database made available by Ancerno, a leading transaction-
cost analysis provider1. The unique advantage of working with such institutional
data is that one can simultaneously analyze the trading of many investors. The main
caveat though is that one has little knowledge about the motives and style behind
the observed portfolio transitions. For example a given metaorder can be part of a
longer execution over multiple days. Another possibility is that the final investor
may decide to stop a metaorder execution midway if prices move unfavourably. Such
effects can potentially bias our results, but we believe that they do not change the
qualitative conclusions below.
In the following we will define as a metaorder a series of jointly reported execu-
tions performed by a single investor, through a single broker within a single day, on
a given stock and in a given direction (buy/sell). However, contrarily to the version
of the database used in Ref. [4], available labels do not allow us to relate different
metaorders executed on behalf of the same final investor by the same or different
brokers during the same day. These should ideally be counted as a single metaorder.
We will comment later on the biases induced by such a lack of information. Thus
each metaorder is characterized by a broker label, the stock symbol, the total volume
of the metaorder |Q| and its sign  = ±1, and the start time ts and the end time te
of the execution.
Our dataset includes the period January 2007 – June 2010 for a total of 880
trading days. Following the procedure introduced in Ref. [4] we use the following
filters to remove possibly erroneous data:
• Filter 1: We select the stocks which belong to the Russell 3000 index discard-
ing metaorders executed on highly illiquid stocks.
• Filter 2: We select metaorders ending before 4:01 p.m.
• Filter 3: We select metaorders whose duration D = te − ts is longer than 2
mins.
• Filter 4: We select metaorders whose participation rate (the ratio between
their quantity and the volume traded by the market between ts and te) is
smaller than 30%.
1Ancerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel Noser Corporation) is a widely recognised consulting firm that
works with institutional investors to monitor their equity trading costs. Its clients include many pension
funds and asset managers. Previous academic studies that use Ancerno data include [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11]. See www.ancerno.com for details.
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Finally we retain around 7.7 million metaorders distributed quite uniformly in time
and across market capitalizations. These filtered metaorders represent around the
5% of the total reported market volume independently of the year and of the stock
capitalization.2 The statistical properties of the metaorders, in terms of volume
fraction, duration, etc., are broadly in line with Ref. [4] even though their data was
aggregated at the level of brokers – for more details see Appendix A. A particu-
larly important statistic for the following analyses is the number N of simultaneous
metaorders in the database, executed on the same stock during the same day. The
probability distribution p(N) is shown in the left panel Fig. 1, indicating that N is
broadly distributed with an average close to 5.
The right panel of Fig. 1 shows the probability distribution of the absolute value
of the volume fraction φ of the metaorders. This variable plays a key role in the
following and is defined as
φ := Q/V
where V is the total volume traded during that day. The figure shows that the
volume fraction distribution is independent of the metaorder side (sign(φ) = ±1,
i.e. buy or sell) and is also very broad.
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Figure 1: (Left panel) Empirical probability distribution of the number N of daily
metaorders per asset. (Right panel) Empirical probability distribution of the absolute
value of the volume fraction φ per metaorder, separately for signs ±1, i.e. buy/sell.
3 The Square Root Law and its Domain of Validity
We will quantify market impact in terms of the rescaled log-price s = log(S)/σ,
where S is the market mid-price, which we normalize by the daily volatility of the
asset defined as σ = (Shigh − Slow)/Sopen based on the daily high, low and open
prices. In this paper we will define impact as the expected change of s between the
open and the close of the day. This choice will avoid an elaborate analysis of when
2Without the above filters, this number would rise to about 10%.
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precisely each metaorder starts and ends, how they overlap and which reference
prices to take in each case. When a metaorder of total volume Q is executed, its
impact will be defined as
I(φ) := E[sclose − sopen|φ], (1)
for a given metaorder signed volume fraction φ.
Empirically, impact is found to be an odd function of φ, displaying a concave
behavior in |φ|. It is well described by the square root law [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19]
I(φ) = Y × φ•δ, (2)
where here and throughout the paper we will denote the sign-power operation by
x•δ := sign(x)×|x|δ. The dimensionless coefficient Y (called the Y-ratio) is of order
unity and the exponent δ is in the range 0.4–0.7. It is interesting to note that in
Eq. (2) only the volume fraction φ matters, the time taken to complete execution or
the presence of other active metaorders is not directly relevant (remember that the
volatility of the instrument has been subsumed in the definition of the rescaled price
s). This formula is surprisingly universal across financial products, market venues,
time periods and the strategies used for execution.
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Figure 2: Market impact curve I(φ) = E[sclose − sopen|φ] as a function of the metaorder
size ratio φ = Q/V computed using the filtered metaorders from the Ancerno dataset in
the period from January 2007 – June 2010. We also show the simple fit I(φ) = A
√
φ+B,
which captures some – but not all – of the discrepancy with the square root law at small
φ.
We first check this empirical result on our dataset. In Fig. 2 we show the market
impact curve obtained by dividing the data into evenly populated bins according to
the volume fraction φ and computing the conditional expectation of impact for each
bin. Here and in the following, error bars are determined as standard errors. Note
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that in all the following empirical plots the price impact curves are normalized by
their Y-ratio and we will abuse the notation I(φ) in order to denote the symmetrized
measure I(φ) = E[(sclose − sopen)||φ|], with  = sign(φ), due to the antisymmetric
nature of I(φ).
While the square root law holds relatively well when 10−3 . φ . 10−1, three
other regimes seem to be present:
1. For very small volume fractions up to φ . 10−4, impact appears to saturate
to a finite, positive value.
2. In the intermediate regime 10−4 . φ . 10−3, impact is closer to a linear
function, although the data is very noisy.
3. In the large φ regime φ & 10−1, impact seems to saturate, or even to decrease
with increasing φ.
These results are robust across time periods and market capitalizations, and
consistent with Ref. [4], where regimes 2. and 3. were also clearly observed. In the
following, we will discard altogether the last, large φ regime, which is most likely
affected by conditioning effects (for example buying more when the price moves down
and less when the price moves up). We will on the other hand seek to understand
the other three regimes within a consistent mathematical framework.
Intuitively, the breakdown of the square root law for small φ comes from the fact
that the signs of the metaorders in our dataset are correlated – particularly so be-
cause some metaorders are originating from the same final investor. Let us illustrate
the effect of correlations on a simplistic example: Imagine that simultaneously to
the considered buy metaorder (with volume fraction φ > 0), another metaorder with
the same sign and volume fraction φm > 0 is also traded. Assuming that the square
root law applies for the combined metaorder (a hypothesis that we will confirm on
data), the observed impact should read
I(φ+ φm) = Y ×
√
φ+ φm. (3)
This tends to the value Y
√
φm when φ→ 0, behaves linearly when φ φm and as
a square root when φ φm. We show in Fig. 2 that this simple fit captures some,
but not all, of the discrepancy with the square root law at small φ. In particular the
intermediate linear region is not well accounted for. We will develop in the following
a mathematical model that reproduces all these effects.
A way to minimize the effect of correlations is to restrict to days/assets where
there is a unique metaorder in the dataset (N = 1). As shown in Fig. 3, impact in
this case is almost perfectly fitted by a square root law. Fig. 3, also shows that as N
increases, significant departures from the square root law can be observed for small
φ, as suggested by our simple model Eq. (3). An alert reader may however object
that the Ancerno database represents a small fraction (∼ 5%) of the total volume.
Even when a single metaorder is reported, many other metaorders are likely to be
simultaneously present in the market. So why does one observe a square root law
at all, even for single metaorders? The solution to precisely this paradox is one of
the main messages of our paper.
4 How Do Impacts Add Up?
In the previous section we showed that the number of metaorders in the market
strongly influences how price impact behaves, but we have yet to provide insight
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Figure 3: Empirical evidence on the effect of the number of metaorders N on the daily
price impact curves IN (φ) normalized by the prefactor Y-ratio: significant departures
from the square root law can be observed for small φ increasing the number N of daily
metaorders per asset.
into why this is the case. As a first step, we want to determine an explicit functional
form of the aggregated market impact of N simultaneous metaorders. As we have
emphasized, impact is non-linear, so aggregation is a priori non-trivial. Should one
add the square root impact of each metaorder, or should one first add the signed
volume fractions before taking the square root? Since orders are anonymous and
indistinguishable, the second procedure looks more plausible. This is what we test
now. Consider the average aggregate impact conditioned to the co-execution of N
metaorders:
I(ϕN ) = E[sclose − sopen|ϕN ], (4)
where ϕN := (φ1, · · · , φN ). We make the following parametric ansatz for this quan-
tity:
I(ϕN ) = Y ×
(
N∑
i=1
φ•αi
)•δ/α
, (5)
where, again, x•α is the signed power of x. By construction this formula is invariant
under the permutation of metaorders, as it should be since they are indistiguishable.
Y and δ set, respectively, the scale and the exponent of the impact function. The
free parameter α interpolates between the case when impacts add up (α = δ) and
when only the net traded volume is relevant (α = 1).
Fig. 4 shows the quality of the fit obtained by least squares regressions of Eq. (5)
for a grid of (α, δ) pairs. We find that the coefficient of determination r2(α, δ) of
the fit is maximized close to the point α = 1.0 and δ = 0.5, which suggests that the
aggregated price impact I(ϕN ) of N metaorders at the daily scale only depends on
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the total net order flow, i.e.3
I(ϕN ) ≈ Y × Φ•1/2, (6)
where Φ =
∑N
i=1 φi. In other words, the market only reacts to the net order flow,
not to the way in which this order flow is distributed across investors.
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Figure 4: The computed coefficient of determination r2(α, δ) of the least squares regres-
sions of Eq. (5) for a grid of (α, δ) pairs. The coefficient of determination is maximized
(r2 = 0.0035) in the vicinity of the point α = 1.0 and δ = 0.5.
One can now plot I(Φ) as a function of Φ for various N , see Fig. 5. One clearly
sees that provided Φ is not too small, impact is independent of N and crosses over
from linear to square root behavior as Φ increases. The linear behavior is in fact
more pronounced at smaller values of N . We now turn to a theoretical analysis that
will allow us to quantify more precisely the co-impact problem, and how the square
root law can survive at large N .
5 Correlated Metaorders and Co-Impact
5.1 The Mathematical Problem
Even if an asset manager knows the average impact formula Eq. (6), this may not
be sufficient to estimate his actual impact which depends strongly on the presence
of other contemporaneous metaorders.
Suppose the manager k wants to execute a volume fraction φk = φ. If all
the other N − 1 metaorders were known, the daily price impact would be given
3We have in fact tested that the assumption α = 1 is also favoured for a general, non parametric
shape for the impact function I(Φ).
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Figure 5: Global market impact I(Φ) = E[I(ϕN )|
∑N
i=1 φi = Φ] normalized by the pref-
actor Y as a function of the net order flow Φ for various buckets in N and symmetrized
as explained in Sec. 3. The inset shows the normalization Y for the different curves.
by the global impact function I(Φ) determined in the previous section, with Φ =
φk +
∑N
i6=k φi.
However, this information is obviously not available to the manager k. His best
estimate of the average impact given N is the conditional expectation
IN (φ) = E[I(Φ)|φk = φ] = E
[
I
(
φk +
N∑
i6=k
φi
)∣∣∣φk = φ] (7)
over the conditional distribution P (ϕN |φk = φ) of the metaorders. Since the number
of metaorders is in general not known either, the expected individual market impact
is given by
I(φ) = Y ×
∑
N
p(N)
∫
dφ1 . . . dφNP (ϕN |φk = φ)
(
φk +
N∑
i 6=k
φi
)•1/2
, (8)
where we have used Eq. (6). In such a way to compute IN (φ) and I(φ) we need
to know the joint probability density function P (ϕN ) := P (φ1, . . . , φN ), which is in
general a complicated and high-dimensional object. Then to create a tractable model
that can be calibrated on data, we must make some reasonable assumption on the
dependence structure of the φi. In the next subsection we investigate the simple case
where the φi are all independent, and then turn to an empirical characterization of
the correlations between metaorders. We finally provide the results of our empirically
inspired model and compare them with the empirical market impact curves.
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Figure 6: (Left panel) Market impact curves IN (φ)/Y for i.i.d. Gaussian metaorders
for different N ∈ {2, 10, 30, 60} and fixed ΣN = Σ = 0.8% computed from empirical
data. The transition from the square root to the linear regime takes place for φ∗N '
Σ
√
N − 1. (Right panel) Empirically estimated φ∗N as a function of the number N of
daily metaorders per asset. This is obtained by computing the empirical order size’s
standard deviation ΣN =
√
V[φ|N ] conditioned to N . The dashed red line shows the
case in which ΣN ∼ 1/N for each N : in the inset we report the standard deviation ΣN
of the order size φ as a function of the number N of daily metaorders per asset.
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5.2 Independent Metaorders
The simplest assumption about the form of P (ϕN ) is that metaorder volumes are
i.i.d., meaning
P (ϕN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(φi). (9)
Assuming for simplicity that each φi is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean
and variance Σ2N , where the lower index indicates an explicit dependence on N . Thus
N−1 simultaneous metaorders generate a Gaussian noise contribution of amplitude
ΣN
√
N − 1 on top of φk = φ. In Appendix B.1.1 we show analytically that:
• For small metaorders the noise term dominates, leading to
IN (φ) ∝ φ when φ φ∗N := ΣN
√
N − 1.
• For large metaorders the N−1 other simultaneous metaorders can be neglected
and thus
IN (φ) ∝
√
φ when φ φ∗N .
In Appendix B.1.2 we show that the above results remain valid in the limit of large
N independently of the shape of the volume distribution provided its variance is
finite.
The full analytical solutions for different N values, but fixed ΣN = Σ, are shown
in the left panel of Fig. 6. One clearly sees the cross-over from a linear behavior
at small φ to a square root at larger φ. However, interestingly, one expects ΣN to
decrease with N , simply because as the number of metaorders increases, the volume
fraction represented by each of them must decrease4. As shown in the right panel of
Fig. 6, this is the case empirically since for N & 10, ΣN indeed decays as N−1 (as
also suggested by Fig. 7 below). Hence, for large N , the crossover value φ∗N decreases
with N as N−1/2. This explains why the square root law can at all be observed when
a large number of metaorders are present. If these metaorders are independent, their
net impact on the price averages out, leaving the considered metaorder as if it was
alone in a random flow, as assumed in theoretical models [12, 13]. We now turn to
the effect of correlations between metaorders.
5.3 Metaorder Correlations
In order to build a sensible model of P (ϕN ) we consider separately the size distribu-
tion and the size cross-correlations. From the right panel of Fig. 1 we observe that
the marginals p(φi) are to a good approximation independent of the direction, buy
or sell, and moderately fat tailed. The latter observation suggests that the total net
order flow Φ =
∑N
i=1 φi is not dominated by a single metaorder. A way to quantify
this is through the Herfindahl index (or “inverse participation ratio”) ζ, defined as:
ζ :=
∑N
i=1 φ
2
i(∑N
i=1|φi|
)2 . (10)
4For example, the variance of a flat Dirichlet random variable (X1, ..., XN ) ∼ Dir(N) describing
fractions is V[Xi|N ] = (N − 1)/(N2(N + 1)) ∼ N−2.
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Figure 7: Average value of the Herfindahl index (or “inverse participation ratio”) E[ζ|N ]
as a function of the number N of daily metaorders per asset computed from the empirical
data (blue dot symbols) and simulating i.i.d. |φi| (red star symbols) extracted from the
empirical distribution illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 1.
This quantity is of order 1/N if all metaorders are of comparable size, and of order
1 if one metaorder dominates. In Fig. 7 we show the dependence of E[ζ|N ] as a
function of N , which clearly decays with N . It also compares very well to the result
obtained assuming the absolute volume fractions |φi| to be independent, identically
distributed variables, drawn according to the empirical distribution shown in Fig. 1.
We therefore conclude that (a) metaorders in the Ancerno database are typically
of comparable relative sizes φ and (b) absolute volume correlations do not play a
major role, and we will neglect them henceforth.
Sign correlations, on the other hand, do play an important role in determining
the impact of simultaneous metaorders. The empirical average sign correlation of
metaorders simultaneously executed on the same asset is defined as
C(N) :=
E[ij |N ]− E[i|N ]2
E[2i |N ]− E[i|N ]2
, (11)
where E[· · · |N ] is the average over all days and assets such that exactlyN metaorders
were executed. Fig. 8 shows the dependence of C on N . We clearly see that on
average the daily metaorders executed on the same asset are positively correlated.
Furthermore, C(N) is seen to decrease as N increases. This is likely due to the fact
that there are multiple concurrent metaorders submitted by the same manager, an
effect that becomes less prominent as N increases. The plateau value C ≈ 0.025 at
large N is, we believe, a reasonable proxy for the correlation of orders submitted by
different asset managers.5
5This value is indeed compatible with the value of C obtained with the version of the database used
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Figure 8: Empirical average sign correlation C(N) as a function of the number N of
daily metaorders: the dashed red line represents the plateau value C ≈ 0.025 at large
N , which, we believe, is a reasonable proxy for the correlation of orders submitted by
different asset managers.
5.4 Market Impact with Correlated Metaorders
A natural model would be to consider the φi’s as exchangeable multivariate Gaus-
sian variables of zero mean, variance Σ2N and cross-correlation coefficient Cφ(N).
Appendix B.2 shows that the qualitative behavior for independent metaorders re-
mains the same when Cφ(N) > 0. Specifically, one finds that the average impact
IN (φ) can be obtained by making the substitution
φ→ φ[1 + (N − 1)Cφ(N)]. (12)
in the expression of IN (φ) for independent Gaussians. This is expected, as (N −
1)Cφ(N) gives the effective number of additional volume-weighted metaorders cor-
related to the original one. By the same token though, IN (φ) still vanishes linearly
for small φ, whereas empirical data suggests a positive intercept when φ→ 0.
As an alternative model that emphasizes sign-correlations, let us assume that
the joint distribution of the φi’s can be written as
P (ϕN ) = P(N )
N∏
i=1
p(|φi|), (13)
meaning that metaorder sizes are independent, while the signs are possibly corre-
lated. This specific form is motivated by the observation that the size of a metaorder
is mainly related to the assets under management of the corresponding financial
institution, while the sign is related to the trading signal. One can expect that
different investors use correlated information sources, while the size of the trades is
idiosyncratic.
by [4], which identified metaorders coming from the same investor.
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Figure 9: Market impact curves IN (φ)/Y computed for the correlated signs model, where
volumes are drawn according to a half-normal distribution with E[|φi|] = Σ
√
2/pi and
Σ = 0.8% is set equal to its empirical value averaged over N . (Left panel) Numerical
simulations for fixed sign correlation C = 0.01 but varying number of metaorders N ∈
{5, 10, 30, 100}. (Right panel) Numerical simulations for fixed number of metaorders
N = 5 but with varying sign correlation C ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5}: as shown in the inset
the intercept IN (0)/Y decreases linearly with the sign correlation for C → 0. Note that
the individual price impact IN (φ) values converges to a positive constant when φ → 0.
For intermediate φ, IN (φ) is linear and crosses-over at larger φ to a square root.
14
We further assume that there is a unique common factor determining the sign of
the metaorders. In other words, the statistical model for the signs is the following:
P(i = +1|˜) = 1
2
(1 + γ˜); P(i = −1|˜) = 1
2
(1− γ˜), (14)
where ˜ is the hidden sign factor, such that P(˜ = ±1) = 1/2, and γ is the sign
correlation between each sign i and the hidden sign factor ˜. A simple calculation
leads to
C(N) = P(i = j)− P(i = −j) = γ2 . (15)
where we omitted the γ’s explicit dependence on N . Contrarily to the Gaussian
case, we have not been able to obtain analytical formulas, but instead relied on
numerical simulations to obtain IN (φ) for different combinations of C(N) and N ,
reported in Fig. 9. Results for unsigned volumes generated from a half-normal
distribution calibrated on data are shown in Fig. 9. We observe that the individual
price impact IN (φ) converges to a positive constant IN (0) > 0 when φ→ 0, despite
IN (0) = 0 for a Gaussian model. For intermediate φ, IN (φ) is linear and it crosses
over at larger φ to a square root. For fixed N the intercept value increases with the
sign correlation C, see the right panel of Fig. 9. The intuition is that conditioned
to the fact that I buy, and independently of the size of my trade, the order flow of
other actors will be biased towards buy as well, and I will suffer from the impact
of their trades. In fact, subtracting the non-zero intercept of IN (φ) leads to impact
curves that look almost identical to those of Fig. 6, i.e. a linear region for small φ
followed by a square root region beyond a crossover value φ∗N ∼ ΣN
√
N − 1. Since
for large N φ∗N → 0, one simply expects a square-root law, shifted by the intercept
IN (0).
5.5 Empirical Calibration of the Model
With the aim to compare the model prediction with empirical data, we propose a
calibration method described in Appendix B.4.1. This is based on the assump-
tion that metaorder signs are independent random variables sampled from a half-
Gaussian calibrated on empirical data. The metaorder sign correlation structure
can be estimated by introducing a realized sign correlation
ρ :=
2
N(N − 1)
∑
1≤i<j≤N
ij , (16)
which is then used to estimate the sign correlation C(N) of Eq. (15). Once the
model is calibrated, we use numerical simulations to compute the expected market
impact I(φ), see Appendix B.4.1 for the precise details of the procedure.
Fig. 10 shows that imposing correlation only between the signs leads to a very
good prediction of the empirical curves, justifying the adoption of the sign corre-
lated model. All the features of the empirical impact curves are qualitatively well
reproduced, in line with Fig. 2. This includes the clear deviations from the square
root law for φ ≤ 10−3 with both a linear regime and a constant price impact I0
when φ→ 0.
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Figure 10: Comparison between calibrated sign-correlated model (colored lines) and
empirical data (circles) for the case N ∈ [2, 10]: The sample is split into two sub-samples
respectively with ρ ≥ 0.05 and 0 ≤ |ρ|≤ 0.05. The theoretical curves are calculated
through numerical simulations as explained in the main text (see Appendix B.4.1 for all
the details of the procedure).
6 Conclusions
It is a commonly acknowledged fact that market prices move during the execution
of a trade – they increase (on average) for a buy order and decrease (on aver-
age) for a sell order. This is, loosely stated, the phenomenon known as market
impact. In this paper we have presented one of the first studies breaking down mar-
ket impact of metaorders executed by different investors, and taking into account
interaction/correlation effects. We investigated how to aggregate the impact of in-
dividual actors in order to best explain the daily price moves. The large number
and heterogeneity of the metaorders traded by financial institutions allows precise
measurements of price impact in different conditions with reduced uncertainty. We
found that both the number of actors simultaneously trading on a stock and the
crowdedness of their trade (measured by the correlation of metaorder signs) are
important factors determining the impact of a given metaorder.
Our main conclusions are as follows:
• The market chiefly reacts to the total net order flow of ongoing metaorders, the
functional form being well approximated by a square root at least in a range of
volume fraction φ. As expected in anonymous markets, impact is insensitive
to the way order flow is distributed across different investors.
• The number N of executed metaorders and their mutual sign correlations
C are relevant parameters when an investor wants to precisely estimate the
market impact of their own metaorders.
• Using a simple heuristic model calibrated on data, we are able to reproduce to
16
a good level of precision the different regimes of the empirical market impact
curves, as a function of φ, N and C.
• When the number of metaorders is not large, and when C > 0, a small
investor will observe linear impact with a non-zero intercept I0, crossing over
to a square-root law at larger φ. I0 grows with C and can be interpreted as
the average impact of all other metaorders.
• When the number of metaorders is very large and the investor has no correla-
tion with their average sign, they should expect on a given day a square-root
impact randomly shifted upwards or downwards by I0. Averaged over all days,
a pure square-root law emerges, which explains why such behavior has been
reported in many empirical papers.
On the last point, we believe that our study sheds light on an apparent paradox:
How can a non-linear impact law survive in the presence of a large number of simul-
taneously executed metaorders? As we have seen, the reason is that for a metaorder
uncorrelated with the rest of the market, the impacts of other metaorders cancel
out on average. Conversely, any intercept of the impact law can be interpreted as a
non-zero correlation with the rest of the market.
Given the importance of the subject, our results present several interesting ap-
plications. Our aggregated price impact model should be of interest both to practi-
tioners trying to monitor and reduce their trading costs, and also to regulators that
seek to improve the stability of markets.
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A Metaorder Statistics
We now describe some statistics of the metaorders. The participation rate pi is
defined as the ratio between the number of shares |Q| traded by the metaorder and
the whole market during the execution interval [ts, te]
pi =
|Q|
V (te)− V (ts) . (17)
The duration D expressed in volume time is equal to
D =
V (te)− V (ts)
V (tc)
, (18)
while the unsigned daily fraction is defined as the ratio between the metaorder
unsigned volume |Q| and the volume V (tc) traded by the market in the whole day:
|φ|= |Q|/V (tc) = pi ·D. (19)
We find that the participation rate pi and the duration D are both well approx-
imated by truncated power-law distributions over several orders of magnitude. The
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Figure 11: Estimation of the probability density function of the participation rate pi
(top left), duration D (top right) and unsigned daily fraction |φ| (bottom left). All
these panels are in log-log scale. The first two also show the best fit with a power-
law function in the region bounded by the vertical dashed lines. The bottom right panel
shows the logarithm of the estimated joint probability density function p(D,pi) in double
logarithmic scale of the duration D and of the participation rate pi. These statistics are
in agreement with the ones obtained in Ref. [4].
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estimated probability density function of the participation rate pi is shown in log-log
scale in the top left panel of Fig. 11. A power-law fit in the region 10−4 ≤ pi ≤ 10−1,
i.e. over three orders of magnitude gives a best fit exponent a = −0.832 ± 0.001.
The top right panel of Fig. 11 shows the estimated probability density function of
the duration D of a metaorder. A power-law fit in the region bounded by vertical
dashed lines (0.01 ≤ D ≤ 0.5) gives a power-law exponent a = −0.954 ± 0.002.
These power laws are very heavy-tailed, meaning that there is substantial variabil-
ity in both the participation rate and the duration. Note that in both cases the
variability is intrinsically bounded, and therefore the power law is automatically
truncated: by definition pi ≤ 1 and D ≤ 1. In addition, for p(D) there is a small
bump on the right extreme of the distribution corresponding to all-day metaorders.
The deviation from a power law for small D is a consequence of our Filter 3 re-
taining only metaorders lasting at least 2 min, which in volume time corresponds
to 2/390 ' 0.005 on average. The bottom left panel shows the probability density
function of the unsigned daily fraction |φ|. In this case the distribution is less fat-
tailed, and clearly not a power law. This is potentially an important result, as the
predictions of some theories for market impact depend on this, and have generally
assumed power-law behavior. In conclusion, the bottom right panel of Fig. 11 shows
the logarithm of the estimated joint probability density function p(D,pi) in double
logarithmic scale. We measure a very low linear correlation (-0.08) between the two
variables, the main contribution coming from the extreme regions, i.e. very large
pi implies very small D and vice versa. In other words, as expected, very aggres-
sive metaorders are typically short and long metaorders more often have a small
participation rate.
B From the Bare to the Market Impact Function
The expected individual market impact of a metaorder with signed volume φ is
estimated by
I(φ) =
∑
N
p(N)IN (φ) (20)
where p(N) is the probability distribution of the daily number N of metaorders per
asset and
IN (φ) = E[I(ϕN )|φk = φ] =
∫
dφ1 · · · dφNP (ϕN |φk = φ)
φk + N∑
i6=k
φi
•1/2
(21)
is the market impact computed from the bare impact function I(ϕN ) := (
∑N
i=1 φi)
•1/2
with fixed N . Assuming that p(N) is kwown a priori the market impact IN (φ) is
given from the expectation in Eq. (21) done over the conditional probability dis-
tribution P (ϕN |φk = φ) of the volume metaorders. However, in such a way to do
analytical computation it is necessary to assume reasonable hypothesis for the joint
distribution function P (ϕN ) := P (φ1, · · · , φN ).
For this reason, we start considering the case of i.i.d. metaorders and we firstly
show analytically how the transition from the square root to a linear market impact
is possible in the i.i.d. Gaussian framework. Secondly, we generalize these results in
the limit of large N for any symmetric volume distribution which sastifies the Central
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Limit Theorem assumptions. Thirdly, we show that the same results continue to be
valid introducing correlation between the signed volumes in a Gaussian framework.
For last, we describe how to compute numerically the market impact in Eq. (21) in
the case of metaorder signs correlated and i.i.d. unsigned volumes.
B.1 Market Impact with IID Metaorders
In the case of i.i.d. signed metaorders, the conditional joint distribution factorizes
as
P (ϕN |φk = φ) =
N∏
i 6=k
p(φi); (22)
this implies that the price impact IN (φ) of a single metaorder φk = φ out of N is
given by
IN (φ) =
∫
dφm
1
2pi
∫
dλe−iλφm pˆ(λ)N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p(φm)
(φ+ φm)
•1/2 =
∫
dφmp(φm)(φ+ φm)
•1/2
(23)
where φm =
∑N
i 6=k φi is the net order flow executed simultaneously to the metaorder
φk and pˆ(λ) = E[eiλφi ] is the characteristic function of the signed volume distribution
p(φi). Although the introduction of the characteristic function pˆ(λ) in Eq. (23) will
be a convenient way to exploit the convergence of the net order flow distribution
p(φm) as discussed in Appendix B.1.2, the computation of the market impact IN (φ)
in a analytical closed form is possible only in the Gaussian case as shown in the next
Appendix B.1.1.
B.1.1 Independent Gaussian Metaorders
In the gaussian case, i.e. p(φi) ∼ N (0,Σ2N ) with Σ2N = V[φi|N ], we can go further
analytically in Eq. (23) since pˆ(λ) = e−Σ
2
Nλ
2/2. In fact the integral representation
of the price impact
IN (φ) =
1
ΣN
√
2pi(N − 1)
∫ ∞
−∞
dφme
−φ2m/(2Σ2N (N−1))(φ+ φm)•1/2 =
=
1
ΣN
√
2pi(N − 1)
∫ ∞
0
dx
√
x
[
e−(x−φ)
2/(2Σ2N (N−1)) − e−(x+φ)2/(2Σ2N (N−1))
]
(24)
can be expressed in the following analytical way
IN (φ) =
Γ(1/4)
2
√
pi
φ
(2(N − 1)Σ2N )1/4
e
− φ2
2(N−1)Σ2
N
1F1
(
5
4
,
3
2
,
φ2
2(N − 1)Σ2N
)
(25)
where Γ(z) =
∫∞
0
xz−1e−xdx is the Gamma function and
1F1
(
5
4
,
3
2
, z
)
=
Γ( 32 )
Γ( 54 )
∞∑
j=0
Γ( 54 + j)
Γ( 32 + j)
zj
j!
(26)
is the Kummer confluent hypergeometric function with z = φ
2
(2(N−1)Σ2N )
[20].
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The price impact IN (φ) in Eq. (25) is shown in the left panel of Fig. 6 for
different N and the parameter ΣN fixed. If the metaorder volume φ is smaller than
the sum of the other N − 1 metaorders, i.e. φ  φm, then price impact is linear.
Instead, when our metaorder dominates, i.e. φ  φm, the price impact follows
a square root function. The transition from the linear to the square root regime
takes place around φ∗N ' ΣN
√
N − 1, where ΣN
√
N − 1 is naturally interpreted as
a measure for the market noise, in agreement with the change of the functional shape
of the rescaled market impact function y(φ˜) = IN (φ)/((N − 1)Σ2N )1/4 represented
in Fig. 12 in function of the adimensional parameter φ˜ := φ/(
√
N − 1ΣN ). To note
furthermore that the linear regime comes out immediately from the expansion of
IN (φ) in Eq. (25) around φ = 0 as follows
IN (φ) =
1
ΣN
√
2pi(N − 1)
∫ ∞
0
dx
√
xe−x
2/(2Σ2N (N−1))
[
e−(φ
2−2xφ)/(2Σ2N (N−1))−e−(φ2+2xφ)/(2Σ2N (N−1))
]
'
'
√
2
pi
φ
(Σ2N (N − 1))3/2
∫ ∞
0
dxx3/2e−x
2/(2Σ2N (N−1)) = 23/4
Γ(5/4)
(pi2Σ2N (N − 1))1/4
φ.
(27)
Remark 1. It follows that for i.i.d. Gaussian metaorders the slope of the linear
price impact region decreases with N (as shown explicitly in Eq. (27)) and the
crossover to the square root region happens in φ∗N obtained by solving
ξ
φ∗N
(Σ2N (N − 1))1/4
' (φ∗N )1/2, (28)
i.e. φ∗N ' ξ−1ΣN
√
N − 1 with ξ = 23/4Γ(5/4)/√pi.
B.1.2 Limit of Large N for Generally Distributed Independent
Metaorders
The previous conclusions discussed in the i.i.d. Gaussian framework are also valid
for others i.i.d. volume distributions as discussed in this Appendix: in fact, we can
generalize them in the limit of large N for any symmetric volume distribution p(φi)
which sastifies the Central Limit Theorem assumptions.
In the limit of large N , for which the Central Limit Theorem applied if certain
conditions (discussed below) on p(φi) are sastified, the symmetric volume distri-
bution p(φm) introduced in Eq. (23) converges to a stable law Gα described by a
characteristic function
pˆ(λ) = E[eiλφm ] = e−c|λ|
α
(29)
where c ∈ (0,∞) is the scale parameter and α ∈ (0, 2] is the stability exponent.
In other words we say that the volume distribution p(φi) belongs to the domain of
attraction of the stable distribution Gα if there exist constants am ∈ R, bm > 0 such
that
b−1m (φm − am)→ Gα, (30)
i.e. the renormalized and recentred sum φm =
∑N
i6=k φi converges in distribution to
Gα. The Central Limit Theorem gives the conditions such that this convergence in
distribution to a stable law Gα is guaranted:
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Figure 12: Rescaled market impact function y(φ˜) = IN (φ)/((N − 1)Σ2N )1/4 in function
of the dimensionless parameter φ˜ := φ/(
√
N − 1ΣN ) with IN (φ) given by Eq. (25): the
vertical dashed red line represents the transition from the linear impact (left side) to the
square-root one (right side).
• p(φm) converges to a Gaussian distribution (α = 2 in Eq. (29)) if and only if∫
|φi|≤x
φ2i p(φi)dφi (31)
is a slowly varying function L(x), i.e. limx→∞L(tx)/L(x) = 1 for all t > 0;
then it follows that if Σ2N = V[φi|N ] <∞
((N − 1)1/2ΣN )−1φm −→ N (0, 1), (32)
while if V[φi|N ] =∞
((N − 1)1/2L1)−1φm −→ N (0, 1) (33)
with L1 a slowly varying function and N (0, 1) a gaussian distribution with
mean zero and variance 1.
• p(φm) converges to a Le´vy distribution (for some α < 2 in Eq. (29)) if and
only if∫ −x
−∞
p(φi)dφi =
c1 + o(1)
xα
L(x), 1−
∫ x
−∞
p(φi)dφi =
c2 + o(1)
xα
L(x), x→∞
(34)
where L(x) is a slowly varying function and c1, c2 are non-negative constants
such that c1 + c2 > 0; then it follows that
((N − 1)1/αL2)−1φm −→ L(c, α) (35)
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with L2 a slowly varying function and L(c, α) a Le´vy distribution with scale
parameter c ∈ (0,∞) and stability exponent α ∈ (0, 2).
Remark 2. It follows immediately that for any volume distributions p(φi) belonging
to the domain of attraction of the normal law, i.e. satisfying the condition in Eq.
(31), the price impact IN (φ) in the limit of large N is described by Eq. (25) and
the transition from a linear to a square root price impact discussed in the Remark
1 continue to be valid: to note that in the case of V[φi|N ] = ∞ it is sufficient to
substitute ΣN in Eq. (28) with the appropriate slowly varying function L1.
Moreover we can show that the transition from a linear to a square root regime
is still present for volume distributions p(φi) belonging to the domain of attraction
of the Le´vy distribution, i.e. that sastify the condition in Eq. (34) with α < 2 and
then p(φm)→ L(c(N − 1)1/α, α). In fact, expanding to first order the bare impact
function I(φ, φm) = (φ+ φm)•1/2 around φ = 0 in Eq. (23)
IN (φ) ' φ
2
∫
dφmp(φm)|φm|−1/2= φ
4pi
∫
dλpˆ(λ)
∫
dφme
−iλφm |φm|−1/2, (36)
introducing the characteristic function of the net order flow φm given by
pˆ(λ) = e−c(N−1)
1/α|λ|α (37)
for large N and taking present that the last integral in Eq. (36) is a known Fourier
transform ∫ +∞
−∞
dφme
−iλφm |φm|−1/2=
√
2pi
|λ|1/2 (38)
we obtain a linear price impact
IN (φ) ' φ
2
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
pˆ(λ)|λ|−1/2dλ. (39)
Though it is not possible to analytically compute the last integral, its behavior for
large N is known using the saddle point approximation or Perron’s method: since
all the conditions of the theorem at page 105 of Ref. [21] are satisfied, one can
approximate the integral in Eq. (39) as follows∫ +∞
−∞
pˆ(λ)|λ|−1/2dλ ∼ Γ
(
1
2α
)
1
αc1/(2α)(N − 1)1/(2α) . (40)
Remark 3. In the limit of large N it is then possible to show analytically that
for volume distributions p(φi) belonging to the domain of attraction of the Le´vy
distribution the price impact is characterized by a linear regime described by
IN (φ) ' 1
2
√
2pi
Γ
(
1
2α
)
φ
α[c(N − 1)]1/(2α) , (41)
followed by a transition to a square root one around φ∗N ' (c(N − 1))1/α.
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B.2 Market Impact with Correlated Gaussian Metaorders
With the aim to introduce correlations between the metaorder volumes ϕN =
(φ1, · · · , φN ) in the Gaussian framework it is useful to define the following joint
probability distribution
P (ϕN ) =
1
ZN
exp
−AN
2
N∑
i=1
φ2i +
BN
N
N∑
i<j
φiφj + µ
N∑
i=1
φi
 , (42)
where ZN is a normalization function, AN and BN are parameters depending on N
and µ is an external field.
B.2.1 Calibration from Data: Means and Correlations
The first step to calibrate P (ϕN ) in Eq. (42) is to express the model parameters
AN , BN and µ in terms of observable quantities, namely E[φiφj |N ] and E[φi|N ].
Due to the presence of an interaction term, the computation of ZN requires the use
of a Hubbard-Stratonovich transformation (valid only for BN > 0):
exp
BN
2N
N∑
i,j
φiφj
 = ∫ ∞
−∞
dy√
2pi/NBN
exp
(
−NBNy
2
2
+BN
N∑
i=1
φiy
)
. (43)
This allows us to rewrite the probability distribution in Eq. (42) as
P (ϕN ) =
1
ZN
√
NBN
2pi
∫
dy
N∏
i=1
exp
[
−1
2
(
AN +
BN
N
)
φ2i + (µ+BNy)φi −
NBN
2
y2
]
.
(44)
The partition function then reads
ZN =
[
2pi(
AN +
BN
N
)]N/2√ ANN +BN
ANN +BN (N − 1) exp
[
N2µ2
2(ANN +BN (N − 1))
]
(45)
valid only for BN < AN + BN/N . Eq. (45) can be used to derive the following
relations:
∂ logZN
∂µ
= NE[φi|N ], (46)
∂ logZN
∂AN
= −N
2
E[φ2i |N ], (47)
∂ logZN
∂BN
=
(
N − 1
2
)
E[φiφj |N ] with (i 6= j) (48)
which assuming symmetric volumes (E[φi|N ] = 0, i.e. µ = 0) are equivalent to
E[φ2i |N ] =
AN + 2BN/N −BN
(AN +BN/N −BN )(AN +BN/N) (49)
and
E[φiφj |N ] = BN/N
(AN +BN/N −BN )(AN +BN/N) . (50)
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Furthermore, combining Eqs. (49) and (50) we can derive the volume correlation
Cφ(N) =
E[φiφj |N ]− E[φi|N ]2
E[φ2i |N ]− E[φi|N ]2
=
E[φiφj |N ]
E[φ2i |N ]
=
BN/N
AN + 2BN/N −BN . (51)
Vice versa, from Eqs. (49) and (51) we can obtain for the model parameters
AN =
1− 2Cφ(N) +NCφ(N)
(1− Cφ(N))(1− Cφ(N) +NCφ(N))E[φ2i |N ]
(52)
and
BN =
NCφ(N)
(1− Cφ(N))(1− Cφ(N) +NCφ(N))E[φ2i |N ]
, (53)
which are useful to fit the Gaussian model to data. We will use Eq. (52) and
Eq. (53) to estimate AN and BN , replacing correlations and expectations by their
empirical natural counterpart. The properties of this kind of estimators, belonging
to the GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) is for instance discussed in Ref.
[22].
B.3 Analytical Computation of Market Impact
To compute analytically the market impact function IN (φ) from Eq. (21) in the
Gaussian correlated framework we adopt the following strategy
1. firstly we factorize the joint probability distribution P (ϕN ) in Eq. (42) with
a not-null external field µ 6= 0;
2. secondly we use the trick of the previous point to compute the market impact
IN (φ) in presence of an effective field µ˜ induced by the correlation of the net
order flow φm =
∑N
i 6=k φi with the known metaorder of size φ.
Step 1. The joint probability distribution in Eq. (42) can be written in the following
matrix form
P (ϕN ) =
1
ZN
exp
(
−1
2
ϕTNMϕN + µTϕN
)
, (54)
where
• M is a NxN real and symmetric matrix with the elements on the principal
diagonal equal to AN and the ones elsewhere equal to −BN/N ,
• µ is a N-dimensional vector with all the elements equal to the scalar µ 6= 0.
Through the orthogonal transformation ϕ˜N = OϕN which diagonalizes the ma-
trix M, i.e. OTMO = diag(λ1, · · · , λN ), the joint probability distribution P (ϕN )
factorizes as
P (ϕ˜N ) =
1
ZN
N∏
m=2
exp
[
−λ2
2
φ˜2m
]
exp
[
−1
2
λ1φ˜
2
1 + µ
√
Nφ˜1
]
(55)
where the N eigenvalues of the matrix M
λ1 = AN − (N − 1)BN
N
=
1
E[φ2i |N ](1− Cφ(N) +NCφ(N))
(56)
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and
λ2 = λ3 = · · · = λN = AN + BN
N
=
1
E[φ2i |N ](1− Cφ(N))
(57)
allow us to rewrite the partition function as
ZN =
√
2pi
λ1
[√
2pi
λ2
]N−1
exp
[
Nµ2
2λ1
]
. (58)
In particular, it emerges that the first component of ϕ˜N = OϕN is equal to
φ˜1 =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
φi, (59)
which put in evidence that the orthogonal basis change ϕN → ϕ˜N is a useful trick
to compute the market impact in the context of correlated Gaussian metaorders.
Step 2. To calculate the price impact IN (φ) defined in Eq. (21) with N overall
correlated Gaussian metaorders and in absence of an external field it is necessary to
explicit the conditional probability distribution
P (ϕN |φk = φ) = P (φ1, · · · , φ, · · · , φN )
p(φ)
(60)
where P (φ1, · · · , φ, · · · , φN ) is given by Eq. (42) setting µ = 0 while the marginal
one is equal to
p(φ) =
1√
2piλ˜1/(λ1λ2)
exp
[
−φ
2
2
λ1λ2
λ˜1
]
, (61)
with λ1 and λ2 respectively given by Eqs. (56) and (57) and
λ˜1 = AN − N − 2
N
BN =
1
E[φ2i |N ][1− Cφ(N) +NCφ(N)][1− Cφ(N)]
. (62)
It follows that the conditional probability distribution is equal to
P (ϕN |φk = φ) =
exp
[
− (N−1)B2Nφ2
2N2λ˜1
]
(2pi/λ˜1)1/2(2pi/λ2)
N−2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ−1N (φ)
× (63)
exp
−AN2
N∑
i 6=k
φ2i +
BN
N
N∑
i<j
i,j 6=k
φiφj +
φBN
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
N∑
i 6=k
φi
 (64)
where it emerges that the conditioning to the metaorder with volume φk = φ is
equivalent to the introduction of an effective field µ˜ proportional to φ. This im-
plies that the price impact in Eq. (21) is given solving the following conditional
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expectation
IN (φ) = E[I(ϕN )|φk = φ] (65)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
N∏
i 6=k
dφi
P (φ1, · · · , φ, · · · , φN )
p(φ)
φ+ N∑
i 6=k
φi
•1/2 (66)
=
1
ΘN (φ)
∫ ∞
−∞
N∏
i6=k
dφi exp
−AN2
N∑
i 6=k
φ2i +
BN
N
N∑
i<j
i,j 6=k
φiφj + µ˜
N∑
i6=k
φi

φ+ N∑
i6=k
φi
•1/2(67)
=
1
ΘN (φ)
∫ ∞
−∞
N∏
i6=k
dφi exp
[−ϕ∗TM∗ϕ∗ + µ˜ϕ∗]
φ+ N∑
i6=k
φi
•1/2 . (68)
Herein
• ϕ∗ = {φi}i6=ki=1,···,N is a vector that contains the N − 1 unknown metaorders
volumes simultaneously executed with the one known φk = φ,
• M∗ is a (N −1)× (N −1) symmetric and real matrix with AN on the principal
diagonal and −BN/N elsewhere: it is easy to check that its eigenvalues are
respectively λ∗1 = λ˜1 as in Eq. (62) and λ
∗
m = λ2 as in Eq. (57) for m =
2, · · · , N − 1.
As mentioned before, to solve Eq. (68) it is useful to use the trick described in Step
1.: we apply in Eq. (68) the orthogonal transformation φ˜∗ = Hϕ∗ that diagonalizes
the matrix M∗ (i.e. HTM∗H = diag(λ˜1, · · · , λ˜N−1)) and since the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix associated to this transformation is equal to one, we obtain that
IN (φ) =
1
ΘN (φ)
∫ ∞
−∞
N∏
m=2
dφ˜∗m exp
[
−λ2
2
(φ˜∗m)
2
]
×
×
∫ ∞
−∞
dφ˜∗1 exp
[
−1
2
λ˜1(φ˜
∗
1)
2 + µ˜
√
N − 1φ˜∗1
]
(φ+
√
N − 1φ˜∗1)•1/2; (69)
then integrating in φ˜∗m for m = 2, · · · , N −1, completing the square in the argument
of the exp[− 12 λ˜1(φ˜∗1)2+µ˜
√
N − 1φ˜∗1] and doing the variable change x = φ+
√
N − 1φ˜∗1
we derive the following final expression
IN (φ) =
1√
2pi(N − 1)/λ˜1
∫ ∞
0
dx
√
x
(
exp
[
− λ˜1
2(N − 1) (x− φ(1 + (N − 1)Cφ(N)))
2
]
−
exp
[
− λ˜1
2(N − 1) (x+ φ(1 + (N − 1)Cφ(N)))
2
])
. (70)
Remark 4. From Eq. (70) it follows that the price impact IN (φ) in the correlated
Gaussian framework is equivalent to the one computed in the independent Gaussian
case (see Eqs. (24) and (25)) substituting
φ −→ φ[1 + (N − 1)Cφ(N)] (71)
and
Σ2N −→ 1/λ˜1. (72)
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B.4 Market Impact with Correlated Signs and IID Unsigned
Volumes
In Section 5.4 we have presented a general model in which the metaorder signs
i = ±1 are correlated while the unsigned volumes |φi| are i.i.d. and described by a
generic distribution p(|φi|) defined on the finite positive support (0, 1). This means
that the joint probability distribution is factorizable as
P (ϕN ) = P(N )
N∏
i=1
p(|φi|). (73)
In this theoretical setup we are not able to compute analytically the price impact
IN (φ) and we will use numerical simulations. To this aim we introduce a latent dis-
crete variable ˜ in order to simulate N correlated signs with the following statistical
model
P(i|˜) = 1
2
(1 + γi˜) (74)
where γ can be estimated from data by averaging the realized sign correlation ρ
appearing in Eq. (16), i.e.
E[ρ|N ] = γ2 . (75)
For clarity we explicitly omit the γ’s dependence on N . Thus to simulate the model
we fix k = +1, we draw a hidden factor ˜ from
P(˜|k = +1) = 1
2
(1 + γ˜) (76)
and then we sample N − 1 other correlated signs {i}i 6=ki=1,···,N with probability
P(i|˜) = 1
2
(1 + γi˜) . (77)
B.4.1 Numerical Computation of Market Impact
We summarize the main steps for the numerical calibration of the price impact
IN (φ) from data. Given the number N of metaorders per stock/day pair and fixing
|φk|= φ > 0:
1. We compute the average sign correlation C(N) = E[ρ|N ] as to obtain γ
through Eq. (75).
2. After fixing the direction k = +1 we simulate N − 1 correlated signs using
Eq. (77).
3. We sample N − 1 random variables |φi| from an half-normal distribution with
mean ΣN
√
2/pi and standard deviation ΣN
√
1− 2/pi where ΣN represents the
empirical standard deviation of signed volumes.
4. We compute numerically the price impact IN (φ) = E[I(ϕN )|k = +1, |φk|= φ]
where I(ϕN ) =
(∑N
i=1 φi
)•1/2
and φi = i|φi|, as defined in Eq. (6).
5. Finally, we compute I(φ) averaging IN (φ) over the empirical distribution p(N)
shown in the left panel of Fig 1.
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